去年1月，我谈到对全球经济前景的乐观看法（《全球经济增长“后劲”如何》(Globalisation's future is the big long-term question)，英国《金融时报》中文网2007年1月16日出版），但我还强调了两个对比：一个是这种乐观看法与全球大部分地区储蓄远远高于投资引发的风险之间的对比；另一个是经济乐观主义与政治前景悲观主义的对比（《经济成功与政治动荡并存的世界》(A divided world of economic success and political turmoil)，英国《金融时报》1月31日出版）。

　　我们现在知道，经济风险确实很大。我们还知道，经济会向政治靠拢，而非反过来。但去年也出现了新的矛盾：对于高收入国家（尤其是美国）短期前景的悲观看法和对发展中国家前景的乐观看法。

　　那么，在2008年，我们会再次看到两种趋势向较差的一种靠拢吗？或者，发展中国家的活力会继续促使全球经济快速增长吗？

　　储蓄过剩和金融脆弱性之间存在联系，这点相当明显。我曾提出，储蓄过剩引发了全球失衡，促使政府采取推动家庭借贷达到吸收资本流入所需水平的货币政策。不断飙升的房价和不断加剧的家庭负债是政策得以发挥作用的两种工具。

　　正如马里兰大学(University of Maryland)的卡门•莱因哈特(Carmen Reinhart)和哈佛大学(Harvard)的肯尼思•罗格夫(Kenneth Rogoff)在新近发表的一篇优秀论文中所指出的，这与上世纪80年代债务危机之前石油美元再循环到发展中国的情况有类似之处。这一次，用他们的话说，储蓄盈余“再循环到了一个存在于美国内部的发展中国家”：次贷借款人*。对银行的影响看上去也类似得令人不安。

　　我没有谈及次贷、证券化、特别投资工具和货币市场危机之间的具体联系。但我确实曾指出，“风险价格低估以及低利率与快速增长的结合几乎招致了巨大的经济错误”。我的错误是低估了全球主要金融机构把自己拖入困境的能力。但我并不孤独：有这些金融机构和我作伴。

　　一个事关重大的问题是，美国是否会长期陷入私人需求增长疲弱的时期。“会”的几率很高。这是我从莱因哈特和罗格夫教授的论文中得出的结论。他们提出，美国陷入的混乱局面，与其它高收入国家过去遭受的更严重的金融危机相似。

　　然而，这场危机中一个值得关注的事实是，新兴经济体开始成为避难所：那里的增长仍在持续；信贷利差几本没有变动（见图表）。值得一提的是，新兴经济体明显未受美国经济放缓的影响。世界银行(World Bank)的最新《全球经济展望》(Global Economic Prospects)适时指出了这点。

 

　　对于这一点，《全球经济展望》提出了3种解释：首先，高收入国家去年整体经济增幅估计约为2.6%，部分原因是欧元区的快速增长；其次，新兴经济体——特别是新兴经济大国——增长动力强劲，估计中国的经济预增幅将达到11.3%，印度为9.0%；第三，经济一体化继续快速进行，全球贸易2007年增长了9.2%。

　　发展中国家的快速增长如今变得如此普遍，这令人吃惊。例如，世界银行估计，2007年，东亚经济增幅为10.0%，南亚为8.4%，东欧和中亚为6.7%，撒哈拉沙漠以南非洲地区为6.1%，拉美为5.1%，中东和北非为4.9%。

　　石油和其它大宗商品价格不断飙升，令这种经济广泛增长的局面变得更为显著（见图表）。这些因素对全球经济增长的影响小得惊人。更合理的看法是将它们视为经济增长的后果，而不是对经济持续增长的限制。

 

　　此外，不断飙升的大宗商品价格对通胀的影响也微乎其微。例如，世界银行指出，2007年，尽管以美元（诚然，美元在暴跌）衡量的非石油大宗商品价格飙升了15%，但七国集团(G7)的消费者价格指数(CPI)平均仅上升了1.7%。世界银行预测，今年的通胀率将维持在这一水平。对通胀乃至通胀预期的控制，至少令央行获得了一些应对房价不断下跌及信贷市场危机的空间。

　　那么，接下来会发生什么呢？我们似乎可以期待基本类似的情况：美国及很多其它高收入国家增长疲软（美国很有可能出现衰退），但其它地区强劲扩张。因而，世界银行预测，高收入国家今年的增长仅为2.2%。但预计发展中经济体的平均增幅为7.1%，其中中国为10.8%，东亚9.7%，印度8.4%，南亚7.9%。

　　那么，这将是一个崭新的世界——由新兴国家带动高收入国家增长。我怀疑结果不会如此良好。不过，那些大型新兴经济体的增长进程确实足够独立，而其政府拥有足够大的自由活动空间，可以保证这一看法的合理性。举例来说，如果中国出口增长放缓，中国政府扩大国内消费不过是一件轻而易举的事。这不再是一个能力的问题，更多的是一个意愿的问题。

　　对于全球经济而言，当前的金融问题也许不是决定性的。但这里有一个关键问题：政治状况会恶化到何等程度？过去一年，政治局势没有显著恶化。在美国总统选举之后，全球很多地区的状况甚至可能明显改善。但是全球经济的健康发展，要求一个和平、合作与开放的世界继续存在。然而，在市场准入及原材料（特别是能源）的获取方面，摩擦似乎可能加剧。当前的金融危机最终会是一个短暂现象，还是会终结一个时代，最重要的是要看在经济放缓的过程中，各国能否保持开放。这将是一个巨大的挑战。

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[NextPage]
CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR THE WORLD'S DIVIDED ECONOMY

Martin Wolf

　　LastJanuary I noted the optimistic view of prospects for the world economy (“Globalisation's future is the big long-term question”, January 9). But I also stressed two contrasts: the first was between this optimism and the risks being created by the excess of savings over investment in big parts of the world economy; and the second was between the economic optimism and pessimism about political prospects (“A divided world of economic success and political turmoil”, January 31).

　　We now know that the economic risks were indeed significant. We also know that the economics converged on the politics, not the other way round. But last year also created a new contradiction: between pessimism about short-term prospects for the high-income countries, particularly the US, and cheerfulness about the outlook for the developing world.

　　So will we see convergence on the worse of the two trends in 2008, once again? Or will the dynamism of the developing countries keep the world economy expanding quickly?

　　That there was a link between the savings glut and the financial fragility was evident. The former, I argued, generated the global imbalances and the monetary policy that drove household borrowing to the level required to absorb the capital inflow. Soaring house prices and rising household indebtedness were the vehicles through which policy worked.

　　As Carmen Reinhart of the University of Maryland and Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard note in a brilliant new paper, this had similarities to the recycling of petrodollars to developing countries that preceded the debt crisis of the 1980s. This time, surplus savings were, in their words, “recycled to a developing country that exists within the US”: the subprime borrowers*. The consequences for banks also look disturbingly similar.

　　I missed the details of the link between subprime loans, securitisation, special investment vehicles and a meltdown in money markets. But I did note that “the underpricing of risk and the combination of low interest rates with fast growth almost invite economic blunders”. My mistake was to underestimate the ability of the world's premier financial institutions to sink themselves in a quagmire. But I was in good company: theirs.

　　The question that matters is whether the US will experience a lengthy period of weak growth in private demand. The chances that it will are high. This is the conclusion I draw from the paper by Professors Reinhart and Rogoff. They argue that the mess the US has fallen into is similar to the more severe financial crises suffered in the past by other high-income countries.

　　Yet the remarkable fact about this turmoil is that emerging economies are emerging as safe havens: growth there is being sustained; and credit spreads have moved little (see charts). The apparent invulnerability of emerging economies to the US slowdown is noteworthy. It is duly noted in the World Bank's latest Global Economic Prospects**.

 

　　For this the Prospects report indicates three explanations: first, the high-income countries as a whole grew at an estimated rate of about 2.6 per cent last year, partly because of the buoyancy of the eurozone; second, the momentum of emerging economies and above all of the giants is formidable, with the expansion of the Chinese economy estimated at 11.3 per cent and of India at 9.0 per cent; third, economic integration continues apace, with world trade growing 9.2 per cent in 2007.

　　It is astonishing how widespread rapid growth has now become in the developing world. In 2007, for example, growth is estimated by the World Bank to have run at 10.0 per cent in east Asia, 8.4 per cent in south Asia, 6.7 per cent in eastern Europe and central Asia, 6.1 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa, 5.1 per cent in Latin America and 4.9 per cent in the Middle East and north Africa.

　　The soaring prices of oil and other commodities make this picture of broadly shared growth yet more noteworthy (see chart). These have had remarkably little impact on global growth. It is far more plausible to view them as a consequence of growth than as a constraint upon its continuation.

 

　　Moreover, soaring commodity prices have had remarkably little impact on inflation. The World Bank notes, for example, that consumer price inflation averaged a mere 1.7 per cent in 2007 in the group of seven leading high-income countries, even though non-oil commodity prices jumped 15 per cent, measured in the (admittedly tumbling) dollar. The bank forecasts inflation at the same rate this year. Control over inflation and, still more, over inflationary expectations has given central banks at least some room to respond to falling house prices and credit market mayhem.

　　So what happens next? More of the same seems to be the expectation: weak growth in the US (quite possibly a recession) and in many other high-income countries, but buoyant expansion elsewhere. Thus the bank forecasts growth in the high-income countries at just 2.2 per cent this year. But developing economies are expected to expand by 7.1 per cent on average, with 10.8 per cent in China, 9.7 per cent in east Asia, 8.4 per cent in India and 7.9 per cent in south ?sia.

　　This then would be a brave new world in which emerging countries would pull high-income countries behind them. I suspect the outcome will not be quite as benign as that. Nevertheless, the growth process in the large emerging economies is indeed sufficiently autonomous and the freedom of manoeuvre of their governments sufficiently large to make this view reasonable. If China's export growth slowed, for example, it would be simple for the Chinese government to expand domestic spending. It is no longer a question of capacity; it is far more one of will.

　　For the global economy current financial troubles may not prove decisive. But there is a crucial caveat: how much worse might the politics get? The past year has seen no noteworthy deterioration. After the US presidential election, the world might even witness substantial improvements in many areas. But the health of the global economy demands the survival of a peaceful, co-operative and open world. Yet friction seems likely to grow over access to markets and raw materials, particularly energy. Whether the present financial crisis proves a blip or the end of an era depends, above all, on whether openness survives the slowdown. That is the big challenge.

[时间：2008-01-23  作者：首席经济评论员马丁&#  来源：英国《金融时报》]